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Tackling unregistered employment is high on the 
political agenda both in Europe and beyond. This is 
exemplified by the European Commission establish-
ing the European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work 
(European Commission 2016) and the International 
Labour Organisation passing Recommendation 208 
(ILO 2015). The reason it is high on the political agenda 
is because the prevalence of employees without writ-
ten contracts or terms of employment means not only 
that the state has reduced control over the quality of 
working conditions, but it also weakens trade union 
and collective bargaining, and it increases pressure on 
legitimate businesses to themselves employ unregis-
tered workers due to the unfair competition they wit-
ness (Andrews, Sanchez, and Johansson 2011)
2011; Williams 2014). To advance understanding of 
this phenomenon, the aim of this paper is to evaluate 
the individual- and country-level variations in unreg-
istered employment so as to provide a new way of 
explaining and tackling this employment relationship. 
To do so, this paper draws upon theoretical devel-
opments in the study of the wider informal economy 
in order to evaluate the individual- and country-
level variations in unregistered employment. On the 
hand, this paper evaluates at the individual-level the 
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the individual- and country-level variations in unregistered employment. 
To analyse whether it is marginalised groups who are more likely to engage in unregistered employment and 
explain the country-level variations, a 2010 Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) involving 38,864 interviews in 35 
Eurasian countries is reported. Multilevel logistic regression analysis reveals that younger age groups, the 
divorced, and those with fewer years in education, are more likely to be unregistered employed. On a coun-
try-level, meanwhile, the prevalence of unregistered employment is strongly associated with tax morale; the 
greater the asymmetry between informal and formal institutions, the greater is the prevalence of unregis-
tered employment. It is also higher when GDP per capita as well as social distribution and state intervention 
(subsidies and transfers, social contribution expenditure, health expenditure) are lower. The paper concludes 
by discussing the theoretical and policy implications. 
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1. InTrODucTIOn
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marginalisation thesis which asserts that populations 
marginalised from the formal labour market are more 
likely to engage in unregistered employment (see 
Williams and Horodnic 2015a,b,c). On the other hand, 
and to explain country-level variations, this paper fol-
lows the lead of recent developments in the study of 
the informal economy by drawing inspiration from in-
stitutional theory (Baumol and Blinder 2008; Helmke 
and Levitsky 2004; North 1990). This argues that all so-
cieties have formal institutions (i.e., codified laws and 
regulations) that define the legal rules of the game 
and informal institutions which are socially shared un-
written rules (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). When there 
is asymmetry between these formal and informal in-
stitutions, the result is the emergence of forms of work 
such as unregistered employment. If correct, then it 
suggests that reducing the commonality of this prac-
tice will require not simply the stronger enforcement 
of formal rules (e.g., by using effective workplace in-
spections), but also a new emphasis on the reduction 
of this institutional asymmetry, which will require 
changes in both informal and formal institutions. To 
determine the changes in formal institutions required, 
three theories are evaluated which have sought to 
explain the various country-level formal structural 
imperfections and failings that are argued to result 
in larger informal economies (Krasniqi, 2007; Krasniqi 
2011; Williams 2013; Krasniqi and Mustafa 2016; Lajqi 
and Krasniqi 2017), namely: economic under-develop-
ment and the lack of modernisation of government 
(modernisation thesis); too much state interference 
in social expenditure and redistribution (state over-
interference thesis), or inadequate state intervention 
and protection of workers (state under-intervention 
thesis). Here, however, these structural conditions are 
more seen as ways of reducing institutional asymme-
try rather than free-standing explanations. 
Therefore, this paper makes following important 
contributions to the informal economy literature. 
Firstly, in the paper reveals some support for the mar-
ginalisation thesis in relation to unregistered employ-
ment, although it reveals that care is required when 
identifying which marginal groups are more likely to 
engage in unregistered employment. Secondly, by 
revealing the strong association between tax mo-
rale and participation in unregistered employment, 
it confirms the usefulness of an institutional theory 
framework. Thirdly, and importantly for advancing un-
derstanding of unregistered employment from an in-
stitutional theory viewpoint, the finding of this multi-
level analysis (individuals within countries) is that the 
propensity to engage in unregistered employment is 
higher when the level of economic development is 
lower (confirming modernisation theory) and when 
the levels of social distribution and state intervention 
(subsidies and transfers, social contribution expendi-
ture, health expenditure) are lower (confirming state 
under-intervention theory and refuting state over-
interference theory). Finally, the paper contributes to 
literature by testing the hypothesis in a cross-country 
analysis in a sample of countries with varying de-
gree of insertional reforms, thus making our findings 
stronger in terms of heterogeneity of sample.
The paper is structured as follows. To advance un-
derstanding on unregistered employment, section 2 
briefly reviews the previous literature on unregistered 
employment and draws upon the study of the wider 
informal economy to develop hypotheses regarding 
the individual- and country-level variations. To test 
these hypotheses, section 3 then reports the data 
used, namely the 2010 Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 
involving 38,864 interviews in 35 Eurasian countries, 
and the analytical methods employed; a multi-level 
logistic regression model utilizing the hierarchical na-
ture of the data (individuals within countries). Section 
4 reports the findings regarding the individual- and 
country-level variations in unregistered employment, 
while section 5 draws conclusions about the theoreti-
cal and policy implications of the findings. 
2. ExPLaInInG unrEGISTErED EMPLOyMEnT: 
THEOrETIcaL fraMInG anD HyPOTHESES 
DEvELOPMEnT
The informal economy, by which is here meant 
paid work that is not unregistered by, or not declared 
to, the authorities for tax, social security and/or la-
bour purposes (Khan 2017; Slack et al. 2017; Williams 
2017; Williams and Windebank 1998; Windebank and 
Horodnic 2017), has attracted the interest of both pol-
icymakers and academics in recent years. This stems 
from that fact that globally, 60 per cent of jobs glob-
ally are in the informal economy (Jütting and Laiglesia 
2009) and that the informal economy is expanding 
relative to the formal economy in many global regions 
(ILO 2011; Williams 2014; Williams and Schneider 
2016).
The informal economy includes not only paid work 
without a legal written contract (i.e., unregistered em-
ployment) but also other paid work not declared to 
the authorities. This includes formal employers not 
declaring some and/or all of the work they under-
take and also under-declaring employment by paying 
some and/or all formal employees an official declared 
wage and an additional undeclared (envelope) wage 
(ILO 2015; Williams 2017b). Although the informal 
economy as whole has been subject to widespread 
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evaluation in recent years, unregistered employment 
has received little attention. The only exceptions are 
Hazans (2011) and Williams and Kayaoglu (2017), 
both of which evaluate its prevalence. Williams and 
Kayaoglu (2017) find that in the European Union, 5 per 
cent of employees reported that they did not have a 
written contract of employment in 2013, while Hazans 
(2011), using European Social Survey data on 30 coun-
tries for the period between 2004 and 2009, finds 
that the proportion of employees without a contract 
is 2.7% in Nordic countries, 9.5% in Southern Europe, 
and 5 per cent in Western and East-Central Europe.
The result is that not only are there few, if any, 
studies of the individual-level distribution of unreg-
istered employment, but neither has there been any 
attempt to explain the country-level variations. To do 
so, therefore, theories used to explain the individual- 
and country-level variations in the broader informal 
economy can be used (Williams 2014; Williams and 
Horodnic 2016). 
When theorising the informal economy at the in-
dividual level, a marginalisation thesis dominates, 
which argues that the informal economy is concen-
trated among populations marginalised from the 
formal labour market and social protection (Williams 
and Horodnic 2015a,b, c, 2017a). Until now, some lim-
ited evidence exists to support this marginalization 
thesis when studying the informal economy. Studies 
have shown informal employment to be concentrated 
among those more likely to be excluded from the for-
mal labour market, including the unemployed (Brill 
2011; Slavnic 2010; Taiwo 2013) and women (ILO 2013; 
Leonard 1994; Stănculescu 2004). However, other 
studies reveal that the unemployed are not more likely 
to participate (Williams 2001), and that men are more 
likely to participate (Lemieux, Fortin, and Frechette 
1994; McInnis-Dittrich 1995). Indeed, a recent evalu-
ation of this marginalisation thesis in relation to the 
informal economy across the European Union reveals 
that although valid when discussing younger people, 
it is not when considering those with fewer years in 
education, women and the unemployed (Williams and 
Horodnic 2015b). Meanwhile, and in relation to under-
declared employment (i.e., where formal employees 
are paid an official declared wage and an additional 
undeclared ‘envelope’ wage so that employers evade 
paying their full tax and social contributions), the find-
ing has been that this is more likely among younger 
persons, men, divorced people (doubtless to hide 
their level of income), and unskilled manual workers 
(Williams and Horodnic 2017b), suggesting again that 
some marginal populations are more likely to be en-
gaged in the informal economy but not others.
The only known studies of the distribution of 
unregistered employment similarly find partial sup-
port for the marginalisation thesis. Although Williams 
and Kayaoglu (2017) find no significant association 
between various socio-demographic and socio-eco-
nomic factors (i.e., gender, age, educational level, and 
occupational status) and the probability of unregis-
tered employment, Hazans (2011) finds that the likeli-
hood of unregistered employment is inversely related 
to education level, students more likely than other 
occupational groups, older and younger employees 
more likely, and women more likely than men to work 
without a contract. Based on these findings from the 
study of the informal economy in general, and the 
only two studies of unregistered employment, regard-
ing the relevance of the marginalisation thesis when 
explaining its distribution, we can therefore here test 
the following propositions:
Individual-level marginalisation hypothesis (H1)
H1a:  Women are more likely to participate in un-
registered employment than men.
H1b:  Younger age groups are more likely to partici-
pate in unregistered employment than older 
age groups.
H1c:  Those divorced or separated are more likely 
to participate in unregistered employment 
than married individuals.
H1d:  Those with fewer years in formal education 
are more likely to participate in unregistered 
employment than those who spent longer in 
formal education.
H1e:  Homeowners are less likely to participate in 
unregistered employment than those renting 
or paying a mortgage. 
Turning to country-level variations, it is again the 
case that theories of the wider informal economy can 
be used to explain cross-national variations in the 
prevalence of unregistered employment. In recent 
years, a new umbrella theorisation, drawing inspira-
tion from institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder 
2008; North 1990), has emerged to explain individual- 
and country-level variations in the informal economy 
(Williams and Horodnic 2015a,b,c). This could be also 
used to explain unregistered employment. From this 
institutionalist perspective, all societies have formal 
institutions, which are codified laws and regulations 
that define the legal rules of the game, and informal 
institutions, which are the ‘socially shared rules, usu-
ally unwritten, that are created, communicated and 
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ 
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727). According to the 
institutional theory research, asymmetries between 
formal and informal institutions can have negative 
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impact on economic development (Williams and 
Vorley 2015; Krasniqi 2014). Literature argues that for-
mal and informal institutions interact in two key ways, 
with formal institutions either supporting (i.e. comple-
menting) or undermining (i.e. substituting) informal 
institutions (Williams et al. 2017; Tonoyan, Strohmeyer, 
and Habib 2010; Krasniqi and Desai 2016; Hashi and 
Krasniqi 2011). Informal institutions can complement 
formal institutions if they create incentives to comply 
with the formal institutions, thereby addressing prob-
lems of social interaction and coordination and en-
hancing the efficiency of formal institutions (Baumol 
1990; North 1990). Similarly, labour law violations, 
such as engaging in unregistered employment thus 
arise when there is a gap between the formal institu-
tions and informal institutions. When this gap is large, 
the prevalence of unregistered employment will be 
higher (cf. Kistruck et al. 2015; Webb et al. 2009). The 
greater the degree of asymmetry between formal 
and informal institutions, the more prevalent will be 
unregistered employment (cf. Williams and Horodnic 
2015a,b). Here, therefore, and to test this explanation 
for country-level variations, the following proposition 
can be tested:
Institutional asymmetry hypothesis (H2): The greater 
is the asymmetry between formal and informal in-
stitutions, the greater is the prevalence of unregis-
tered employment. 
What, however, causes the existence of this asym-
metry? Much of the existing literature asserts that 
it is country-level formal institutional imperfections 
and failures that lead populations’ norms, values and 
beliefs not to be in symmetry with the codified laws 
and regulations. In the study of the informal economy, 
three alternative theories exist that seek to explain the 
country-level formal structural imperfections and fail-
ings that result in larger informal economies (Williams 
2013). 
Firstly, a ‘modernisation’ thesis has argued that the 
informal economy becomes less prevalent with eco-
nomic development and the modernisation of govern-
ment which leads to a reduction in public sector cor-
ruption (Lewis 1959; Packard 2007). Applying this to 
the cross-national variations in unregistered employ-
ment, this perspective would thus view unregistered 
employment as more prevalent in less developed 
economies, measured in terms of GDP per capita, and 
societies in which there is a lack of modernisation of 
the state bureaucracy. To explore its validity, therefore, 
the following hypothesis can be tested:
Modernisation hypothesis (H3): Unregistered em-
ployment will be less prevalent in wealthier and 
more modernised economies.
H3a:  Unregistered employment will be less preva-
lent in wealthier economies
H3b:  Unregistered employment will be less preva-
lent in societies with stronger legal rights.
H3c:  Unregistered employment will be less 
prevalent in societies with lower levels of 
corruption.
Secondly, a ‘state over-interference’ thesis asserts 
that the informal economy is the result of high taxes 
and too much state interference in the free market 
and that reducing taxes and state interference in work 
and welfare arrangements is the way forward (De Soto 
1989, 2001; London and Hart 2004; Nwabuzor 2005; 
Schneider and Williams 2013). From this perspective 
therefore, unregistered employment will be more 
prevalent in countries with higher taxes and levels of 
state interference in work and welfare systems. To ex-
plore the validity of this explanation in consequence, 
the following hypothesis can be tested:
State over-interference hypothesis (H4): unregistered 
employment will be less prevalent in economies 
with lower levels of state-interference.
Third and finally, and inverse to the ‘state over-
interference’ thesis, a ‘state under-intervention’ thesis 
claims that the informal economy results from inad-
equate levels of state intervention in work and wel-
fare arrangements which leaves workers less than 
fully protected. The focus therefore should be upon 
introducing social protection for workers, reducing 
inequality and pursuing labour market interventions 
to help vulnerable groups (Castells and Portes 1989; 
Davis 2006; Gallin 2001; ILO 2014; Slavnic 2010; Taiwo 
2013). In consequence, unregistered employment 
from this perspective will be less prevalent in coun-
tries with relatively high levels of state intervention in 
work and welfare arrangements. To evaluate the valid-
ity of this explanation therefore, the following hypoth-
esis can be tested:
State under-intervention hypothesis (H5): 
Unregistered employment will be less prevalent in 
economies with greater state intervention
3. DaTa anD varIabLES
3.1  Data and sample
To evaluate these hypotheses in relation to Eurasian 
countries, data is here reported from the second round 
of the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS II), conducted 
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jointly by the World Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 2010 (for 
details see EBRD 2011; Williams and Krasniqi 2017). 
The survey covers 35 Eurasian countries with vary-
ing degrees of economic development, including 
transition and developed economies1. The survey 
coverage has been expanded to include five western 
European “comparator” countries (France, Germany, 
Italy, Sweden and the UK) ‘allowing us to benchmark 
the transition region against some advanced market 
economies, thereby giving a clearer perspective on 
the remaining challenges facing transition countries’ 
(EBRD 2011, p.2).
In each country, a nationally representative sample 
of between 1000-1500 households was selected for 
face-to-face interviews, depending on the size of the 
country. The advantage of the LiTS is that it builds on 
a consistent sampling methodology across countries. 
Within each household the head of household was 
interviewed about individual and household char-
acteristics, and the ‘last birthday’ rule was applied to 
randomly choose the household member (who could 
also be the household head) for the remaining mod-
ules of the survey. The standard approach to sample 
design in each country was multi-stage random prob-
ability stratified clustered sampling. The sample was 
stratified by geographical region and the level of ur-
banity. To aid the development of the questionnaire, 
two rounds of piloting were conducted. 
The questionnaire enables a detailed analysis of 
how people across the region perceive the impacts 
of transition on their lives and their attitudes towards 
transition issues in general. The survey contains spe-
cific questions on peoples’ economic status and for 
those employed, whether they have written work 
contracts or not. The survey also contains information 
about their attitudes towards paying taxes as well as 
their individual (gender, age, marital status, educa-
tion) and household characteristics (owning or rent-
ing a house). In addition to the results of this survey, 
the original database has been here combined with 
country-level indicators from the World Bank such as 
GDP per capita, government spending, health expen-
ditures, corruption perception index, and strength 
of the legal rights system. The country level indica-
tors enable an evaluation of the explanations for the 
country-level variations in unregistered employment, 
1  Countries included in the sample Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Estonia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, France, Georgia, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, 
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan. 
including the influence of tax morale (as a proxy indi-
cator of the degree of institutional asymmetry), which 
is becoming a very popular strand in recent research 
(Krasniqi and Desai 2016; Williams and Krasniqi 2017, 
Williams and Martínez 2014, Williams and Horodnic 
2017b). 
3.2  variables 
To analyse the above hypotheses, the dependent vari-
able is a dichotomous variable extracted from the LiTs 
II (2010) survey based on the following question: “ Do 
you have a written contract or a labour book for this 
job?”. For the purposes of multi-level logit estimation, 
the dependent variable takes values of 1 when the an-
swer is No, and 0 otherwise.
To analyse the hypotheses regarding the levels of 
unregistered employment across socio-demographic 
and socio-economic groups, the following individual-
level variables are analysed to test hypotheses H1a-1e 
and H2:
 – Tax morale: a dummy variable with value of 1 if 
individual has answered - seriously wrong and 
wrong, and 0 otherwise from the following 
question: “how wrong if at all, do you consider 
the following behaviour: paying cash with no 
receipts to avoid paying VAT or other taxes: not 
wrong at all, a bit wrong, wrong, and seriously 
wrong” 
 – Gender: a dummy variable with value 1 for males 
and 0 for females. 
 – age: a continuous variable for the age and its 
squared term. 
 – Marital status: a categorical variables for the 
marital status of the respondent with value 1, 
for singles, for those separated or divorced, wid-
owed, and value 0 for reference base category 
for married individuals. 
 – number of children: it is a continuous variable for 
the number of children below in the household. 
 – Household ownership: a categorical variable for 
the home ownership status of the respond-
ent, with value 1 for those who are paying the 
mortgage or rent a house, and zero for those 
who own outright a house as a reference base 
category. 
 – Education: a categorical variable for the edu-
cational level with value of 1 for primary and 
secondary education, and zero for university 
or postgraduate education as a reference base 
category.
To analyse hypotheses H3-H5, we examine the 
country-level variables deemed important in each 
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explanation. To do this, we here use data from the 
World Development Indicators database from 2010 
and Transparency International (2014). To evaluate the 
modernisation hypotheses H3a, H3b and H3c, the re-
spective indicators used are as follows: 
 – GDP per capita in purchasing power standards 
(current international $). For the purposes of 
testing for a nonlinear relationship with tax mo-
rale, we constructed GDP per capita squared. 
 – Strength of legal rights index. Strength of legal 
rights index measures the degree to which col-
lateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of 
borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lend-
ing. The index ranges from 0 to 12, with high-
er scores indicating that these laws are better 
designed. 
 – cPI (corruption perception index). Public sec-
tor corruption perceptions index, which scores 
countries on a scale from zero to 10, with zero 
indicating high levels and 10 low levels of per-
ceived public sector corruption. 
To evaluate the contrary ‘state over-interference’ 
and ‘state under-intervention’ hypotheses (H3 and 
H4), meanwhile, the indicators used to measure the 
level of social redistribution, and state intervention 
and expenditure, are: 
 – Subsidies and other transfers (% of expense). 
Subsidies, grants, and other social benefits in-
clude all unrequited, nonrepayable transfers on 
current account to private and public enterpris-
es; grants to foreign governments, international 
organizations, and other government units; and 
social security, social assistance benefits, and 
employer social benefits in cash and in kind.
 – Social contributions (% of revenue). Social contri-
butions include social security contributions by 
employees, employers, and self-employed indi-
viduals, and other contributions whose source 
cannot be determined. They also include actual 
or imputed contributions to social insurance 
schemes operated by governments.
 – Health expenditure per capita as a percentage of 
GDP per capita
4. MuLTI-LEvEL MODELLInG 
Given the hierarchical structure of the data, with 
individuals nested within countries, for the economet-
ric analysis we use a series of multilevel models. As the 
dependent variable is a binary variable taking a value 
of 1 if the respondent declared that s/he is working 
without contract, and 0 otherwise, we employ mixed-
effects logistic regression (Snijders and Bosker 2011, 
Hamilton 2012). The likelihood-ratio test that there is 
no cross-country variation in unregistered employ-
ment can be safely rejected in baseline model as well 
as in all other models. This means that the mixed-
effects logistic regression should be used. In the first 
stage of the analysis, a baseline random model with 
no explanatory variables was estimated to test wheth-
er a multilevel approach was appropriate for this anal-
ysis. The analysis shows that 8-12 per cent of the vari-
ance in participation in unregistered employment was 
accounted for at the country level (see ICC in Table 2). 
Random intercepts in the output above exhibit signifi-
cant variation, judged by a likelihood-ratio test versus 
an ordinary logistic regression (p = 0.000), or by the 
standard deviation of random intercepts (0.668) being 
much more than its standard error (0.082) (baseline 
Model 0). The Model 1 includes socio-demographic 
variables, while in Model 2 to Model 9 in sequence or-
der country level indictors have been introduced. 
Altogether, the seven models introducing these 
contextual variables (M2-5) improve significantly the 
explanatory power of models. Yet, the interclass corre-
lation has only lowered to 8.2 (model 6) per cent from 
the initial 11.9 per cent of the baseline (M0 model). 
The ICC still indicates that 8.2 per cent of the variation 
in participation in unregistered employment due to 
country level differences across the countries in our 
sample remains unexplained. The country level char-
acteristics we consider to test our hypotheses only ac-
count for 2 per cent of the country level variation in 
unregistered employment. Cleary, there may be other 
country level factors that we do not consider here 
that may explain the differences. The final logit inter-
cept model including both individual level explana-
tory variables and country-level explanatory variables 
takes the following form (see Steele 2009; Williams 
and Horodnic, 2017a): 
where,  β0 is the overall intercept,  β1 is the cluster 
specific effect,  β2 is the contextual effect,  Xij is the 
vector containing individual level explanatory varia-
bles,  Xj  is the vector containing country level explan-
atory variables and  uj  is the group (random) effect.
5. rESuLTS
To evaluate firstly, whether the association be-
tween tax morale and participation in unregistered 
employment is significant when other characteris-
tics are taken into account and held constant (H1), 
���� ���1 � ��� � � �0 � �1��� � �2�� � ��  
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Table 1:  Multilevel Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression of Participation in Unregistered Employment
VARIABLES M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
Tax morale -0.162*** -0.162*** -0.162*** -0.163*** -0.166*** -0.217*** -0.146***
(0.0368) (0.0368) (0.0368) (0.0368) (0.0410) (0.0438) (0.0372)
Gender (male) 0.660*** 0.660*** 0.660*** 0.660*** 0.575*** 0.560*** 0.647***
(0.0341) (0.0341) (0.0341) (0.0341) (0.0387) (0.0414) (0.0346)
Age 0.0950*** 0.0951*** 0.0950*** 0.0953*** 0.0786*** 0.0713*** 0.0964***
(0.00724) (0.00724) (0.00724) (0.00724) (0.00798) (0.00855) (0.00734)
Age squared -0.00126*** -0.00126*** -0.00126*** -0.00126*** -0.00108*** -0.00100*** -0.00128***
(8.11e-05) (8.11e-05) (8.11e-05) (8.11e-05) (8.80e-05) (9.42e-05) (8.21e-05)
Marital status (RC: Married)
Single 0.0674 0.0695 0.0670 0.0702 0.0707 0.123** 0.0700
(0.0485) (0.0485) (0.0485) (0.0485) (0.0542) (0.0568) (0.0493)
Divorced/separated 0.109* 0.110* 0.109* 0.111* 0.127* 0.183*** 0.111*
(0.0613) (0.0613) (0.0613) (0.0613) (0.0662) (0.0691) (0.0614)
Widowed -0.340*** -0.341*** -0.340*** -0.341*** -0.435*** -0.449*** -0.339***
(0.0855) (0.0855) (0.0855) (0.0855) (0.0925) (0.103) (0.0856)
No of children -0.0195 -0.0198 -0.0196 -0.0203 -0.0716*** -0.0744*** -0.0161
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0219) (0.0243) (0.0182)
Home ownership (RC owner)
Rented 0.00790 0.0138 0.00872 0.0152 -0.0101 -0.0245 0.00775
(0.0543) (0.0543) (0.0543) (0.0544) (0.0584) (0.0607) (0.0547)
Paying mortgage 0.00481 0.0146 0.00564 0.0138 0.0158 0.0292 0.00141
(0.0724) (0.0726) (0.0724) (0.0727) (0.0753) (0.0763) (0.0732)
Education (primary RC)
Secondary 0.189*** 0.188*** 0.189*** 0.187*** 0.148** 0.115 0.164**
(0.0622) (0.0622) (0.0622) (0.0621) (0.0703) (0.0714) (0.0640)
University -0.170** -0.171** -0.170** -0.174** -0.116 -0.0205 -0.194***
(0.0728) (0.0728) (0.0728) (0.0727) (0.0810) (0.0829) (0.0742)
Country-level indicators
Corruption Perception Index -0.114*
(0.0619)
Strength of legal rights index 0.000135
(0.000103)
GDP per capita -9.04e-05***
(2.94e-05)
GDP per capita squared 1.67e-09***
(6.46e-10)
Subsidies and other transfers (% 
of revenue)
-0.0244**
(0.0110)
Social contributions (% of 
revenue)
-0.0192*
(0.00995)
Health expenditure, total (% of 
GDP)
-0.000201**
(9.93e-05)
Constant -2.139*** -3.862*** -3.402*** -3.876*** -3.270*** -2.072*** -2.821*** -3.602***
(0.115) (0.203) (0.319) (0.203) (0.262) (0.670) (0.386) (0.240)
Observations 38,864 36,263 36,263 36,263 36,263 30,049 28,276 35,198
Number of groups 35 35 35 35 35 29 27 34
Identity: country (Variance 
constant)
0.668 .673 .642 .668 .583 .656 .542 .642
ICC 0.119 .121 .111 .119 .093 .115 .082 .111
LR Test 1601*** 1426*** 1305*** 1402*** 1060*** 1089*** 583*** 1210***
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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secondly, whether various marginalised groups are 
more likely to engage in unregistered employment 
(H2), and third and finally, the validity of the contrast-
ing explanations for the cross-national variations in 
the prevalence of unregistered employment (H3-5), 
we here report the results of a multilevel logistic re-
gression model, which utilises the hierarchical nature 
of the data (individuals within countries). 
Examining whether there is a significant associa-
tion between tax morale and participation in unregis-
tered employment, this is found to be the case across 
all models (confirming H1). This reinforces previous 
work on this subject with regard to the wider infor-
mal economy (Williams and Franic 2015; Williams and 
Horodnic, 2015a,b,c, 2017; Williams et al. 2015) which 
has used tax morale as a proxy for the degree of in-
stitutional asymmetry. It displays that the greater the 
degree of institutional asymmetry, the greater is the 
prevalence of unregistered employment. 
To evaluate the marginalisation thesis that unreg-
istered employment is concentrated among popula-
tions marginalised from the formal labour market and 
social protection we introduce series of econometric 
models. Model 1 in Table evaluates the relationship 
between various socio-demographic and socio-eco-
nomic characteristics and the likelihood of participa-
tion in unregistered employment. This shows that 
everything else being equal, men are more likely to 
participate in unregistered employment than women 
(refuting hypothesis 2a). Instead, it reveals how the 
exclusion of women from the formal labour market is 
further compounded when examining unregistered 
employment. It also reveals, similar to previous studies 
(European Commission 2014; Williams and Horodnic 
2016) that younger age groups seem to have higher 
levels of participation in unregistered employment 
due to their greater exclusion form the formal labour 
market (confirming hypothesis 2b). However, it also 
reveals an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
age and unregistered employment, suggesting that 
participation in unregistered employment increase 
with age up to certain level and then decreases as age 
increases. It is also the case that divorced tend to have 
higher probability of engaging in unregistered em-
ployment compared with the reference group of mar-
ried people (confirming H2c), while the widowed have 
less likelihood of participating in informal work. There 
is no relationship, however, between home owner-
ship and those paying a mortgage and renting house, 
and participation in unregistered employment (re-
futing H2d), although educational level is important. 
Individuals with secondary education are more to en-
gage in unregistered employment and those with uni-
versity education less likely, to engage in unregistered 
employment (confirming H2e). 
To test H3-5 regarding the explanations for the 
cross-national variations in the prevalence of unregis-
tered employment, and given that these country-level 
variables are strongly correlated (see Table A1 in the 
Appendix), sequential models are applied to provide 
alternative perspectives on the cross-national varia-
tions in the prevalence of unregistered employment. 
Starting with the modernisation thesis, model 2 
reveals that for the index of perceived public sector 
corruption, coded in a way where higher values mean 
lower levels of perceived public sector corruption, the 
lower is the perception of public sector corruption, 
the lower is the prevalence of unregistered employ-
ment (confirming H3b). However, model 3 identifies 
no significant association between the strength of 
legal rights and the prevalence of unregistered em-
ployment (refuting H3c). In model 4, meanwhile, a sig-
nificant U-shaped relationship is identified between 
unregistered employment and GDP per capita. That 
is, the higher the level of economic development as 
measured by GDP per capita is, the lower is the prev-
alence of unregistered employment, but this effect 
holds only after GDP per capita has reached some 
minimum level (confirming H3a), thus supporting the 
modernisation thesis. 
Turning to the state over-interference versus the 
state under-intervention theses, a positive and sta-
tistically significant relationship is found for the two 
measures of social redistribution, namely subsidies 
and other transfers in model 5, and social contribu-
tion expenditure in model 6, as well as for one meas-
ure on the expenditure side of government, namely 
health expenditure in model 7. The greater the state 
intervention and the greater the state expenditure on 
social redistribution, the lower is the prevalence of un-
registered employment, thus supporting the state un-
der-intervention thesis that unregistered employment 
will be less prevalent in economies with higher levels 
of state expenditure (confirming H5) and negating the 
state over-interference thesis that unregistered em-
ployment will be more prevalent in economies with 
higher levels of state expenditure (refuting H4). 
DIScuSSIOn anD cOncLuSIOnS
To evaluate whether unregistered employment is 
more likely to be conducted by marginalised popu-
lations, this paper has revealed that that younger 
age groups, the divorced, and those with fewer years 
in education, are more likely to be unregistered em-
ployed. However, women and those not owning their 
own household are not more likely to do so. On a 
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country-level, meanwhile, the prevalence of unreg-
istered employment is strongly associated with tax 
morale; the greater the asymmetry between informal 
and formal institutions, the greater is the prevalence 
of unregistered employment. It is also higher when 
GDP per capita as well as social distribution and state 
intervention (subsidies and transfers, social contribu-
tion expenditure, health expenditure) are lower. 
In terms of theoretical advances therefore, this pa-
per makes three major contributions. Firstly, it reveals 
some support for the marginalisation thesis in rela-
tion to unregistered employment, although it reveals 
that care is required when identifying which marginal 
groups are more likely to engage in unregistered em-
ployment. Secondly, by revealing the strong associa-
tion between tax morale and participation in unreg-
istered employment, it confirms the usefulness of an 
institutional theory lens. The greater the degree of 
asymmetry between the codified laws and regula-
tions of formal institutions and the norms, values and 
beliefs of citizens that constitute the informal institu-
tions, the greater is the prevalence of unregistered 
employment. Thirdly, and importantly for advancing 
understanding of unregistered employment from an 
institutional theory viewpoint, the finding of this mul-
ti-level analysis (individuals within countries) is that 
the propensity to engage in unregistered employ-
ment is higher when the level of economic develop-
ment is lower (confirming modernisation theory) and 
when the levels of social distribution and state inter-
vention (subsidies and transfers, social contribution 
expenditure, health expenditure) are lower (confirm-
ing state under-intervention theory and refuting state 
over-interference theory). 
In terms of policy implications therefore, the find-
ing is that reducing the prevalence of unregistered 
employment will require a new emphasis on the re-
duction of institutional asymmetry, which will require 
changes in both informal and formal institutions. To 
determine the changes in formal institutions required, 
this paper has revealed that there needs to be a focus 
upon not only awareness raising to change attitudes 
norms and beliefs but also the formal institutional fail-
ings and imperfections that lead to this asymmetry, 
namely by increasing the level of GDP per capita and 
importantly, increasing spending on social distribu-
tion and state intervention (subsidies and transfers, 
social contribution expenditure, health expenditure). 
There are, however, limitations to this study and 
what is known. It is not currently known how the 
working conditions of those engaged in unregis-
tered employment differ to their equivalents in reg-
istered employment, nor their motives for engag-
ing in such employment. Until this is evaluated, the 
evidence-base on the implications of unregistered 
employment will remain unknown. Moreover, only a 
limited range of country-level structural conditions 
associated with unregistered employment have been 
evaluated, albeit selected based on existing theoreti-
cal positions. Future research might evaluate a wider 
range of country-level structural conditions, albeit 
from a similar theoretically-driven perspective from 
the emergent understanding of this form of work. It 
would also be useful to know whether similar findings 
are identified in other global regions as has been iden-
tified across these 35 Eurasian countries. 
In sum, this paper has revealed the individual- and 
country-level variations in unregistered employment, 
revealing that unregistered employment is concen-
trated among marginal groups and that it is more 
prevalent in countries where the degree of asymme-
try between formal and informal institutions is great-
er, and where there are lower levels of GDP per capita 
and lower levels of social distribution and state inter-
vention. If this stimulates further research on unregis-
tered employment both to develop a more in-depth 
understanding and to test whether similar findings 
are identified in other global regions, then it will have 
fulfilled one of its intentions. If this then leads to a 
reconsideration of how unregistered employment is 
tackled, and to greater emphasis being put on tack-
ling the formal institutional imperfections and failings 
that lead to this institutional asymmetry, and thus 
higher levels of unregistered employment, then it will 
have fulfilled its wider intention. 
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Table A:  Correlations amongst the Country Level Variables
  Variables
Corruption 
Perception 
Index
Strength of 
the legal rights 
index
GDP  
per capita
GDP per capita 
squared
Subsidies and 
other transfers 
(% of revenue)
Social contri-
butions (% of 
revenue)
Health 
expenditure, 
total (% of 
GDP)
1
Corruption Perception 
Index 1.000            
2
Strength of the legal 
rights index 0.268*** 1.000          
3 GDP per capita 0.837*** -0.013* 1.000        
4 GDP per capita squared 0.788*** -0.002 0.966*** 1.000      
5
Subsidies and other 
transfers (% of revenue) 0.190*** 0.090*** 0.213*** 0.142*** 1.000    
6
Social contributions (% 
of revenue) 0.290*** -0.186*** 0.240*** 0.089*** 0.616*** 1.000  
7
Health expenditure, 
total (% of GDP) 0.816*** -0.004 0.969*** 0.908*** 0.260*** 0.360*** 1.000
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.00
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